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ABSTRACT 
Anxiety can have positive effects on some aspects of cognition and negative effects on others. The current 
study investigated whether task-relevant anxiety could improve people’s ability to withhold responses in a 
response inhibition task. Sixty-seven university students completed a modified and an unmodified version of 
the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997) and provided subjective measures 
of arousal and thoughts. Anxiety appeared to improve participants’ ability to withhold responses. Further, 
participants’ performance was consistent with a motor response inhibition perspective rather than a mind-
wandering perspective of SART commission error performance. Errors of commission were associated with 
response times (speed-accuracy trade-off) as opposed to task-unrelated thoughts. Task-related thoughts were 
associated with the speed-accuracy trade-off. Conversely task-unrelated thoughts showed an association with 
errors of omission, suggesting this SART metric could be an indicator of sustained attention. Further 
investigation of the role of thoughts in the SART is warranted. 
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1.  Introduction 
Unravelling the relationship between subjective states, especially those which are consciously reportable, 
and performance may help resolve the role consciousness plays in human behavior. Matthews et al. write 
(2002, p. 316), “a subjective state may be defined as a relatively transient mental quality permeating 
conscious awareness whose representation is distributed across a variety of mental processes or structures, 
and which has the potential to generalize across activities and contexts.” Matthews (2001) proposes a state-
mediation model in which environmental conditions and tasks impact internal states which then influence 
information-processing. Research has explored the performance correlates of conscious states.  
For example, anxiety and arousal states affect cognitive performance. Often anxiety has negative 
consequences, such as being detrimental to working memory (Matthews & Campbell, 1998) and test anxiety 
has been found to be detrimental to retrieval from long term memory (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996; Kanfer & 
Stevenson, 1985).  Energetic arousal, however, correlates with perceptual sensitivity on high-event target 
detection tasks and visual search tasks (Funke, Matthews, Warm, & Emo, 2007; Helton, Shaw, Warm, 
Matthews, & Hancock, 2008; Helton & Warm, 2008; Matthews & Davies, 1998a; Matthews & Davies, 
1998b; Matthews, Davies, & Lees, 1990). Humphreys and Revelle (1984) suggested arousal increases the 
availability of resources for sustained information-processing. There are situations where experiencing 
anxiety may also have positive effects on a person’s cognition. In a recent study, Robinson, Krimsky, and 
Grillon (2013) showed that the threat of a painful electric shock increased participants’ ability to withhold 
responses in a response inhibition task. In their experiment anxiety was induced externally to the task itself 
by the threat of electric shock. Whether or not task-relevant anxiety can similarly produce advantageous 
effects remains to be seen.  
In the current study, participants completed a Go/No-Go response task as used by Robinson and 
colleagues (2013). This time however, the stimuli intended to induce anxiety was incorporated into the task 
itself, and thus task-relevant anxiety rather than task-irrelevant anxiety was examined. The Go/No-Go 
response task used was the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Roberston Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). This is an experimental paradigm where participants respond to frequent Go 
stimuli and withhold responses to rare No-Go stimuli. Normally number stimuli 1-9 are used in the SART, 
but researchers have employed picture stimuli as well (Head & Helton, 2013). In the current experiment, we 
used pictures of spiders judged to be negative and arousing in nature, thus incorporating the anxiety-inducing 
stimuli into the task itself. The SART has been used extensively in research in a variety of contexts and 
populations. The primary metrics of interest are errors of commission, errors of omission, and response times 
to Go stimuli. A commission error describes a failure to withhold to a rare No-Go target stimulus, while an 
omission error is a failure to respond to a Go stimulus. Errors of commission are characteristically high in the 
SART; an error rate upwards of thirty to fifty percent is not uncommon (Carter, Russell, & Helton, 2013; 
Wilson, Head, & Helton, 2013).  
The SART is characterized by a speed-accuracy trade-off, where faster response times are associated with 
more errors of commission (Helton, 2009; Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011; Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009; 
Peebles & Bothell, 2004). While recognized as requiring response inhibition, there has been a debate 
regarding what the SART actually measures. One perspective is that errors of commission are primarily the 
result of absentmindedness caused by mind wandering (Smallwood et al., 2004). In tasks such as the SART, 
there is little exogenous support of attention in the time between critical targets. Smallwood and colleagues 
argue that this causes participants to become bored with the monotonous nature of the SART and thus their 
attention drifts from the task, which is manifested as an increase in task-unrelated thoughts. From this 
perspective SART commission errors are indicators of perceptual decoupling. Another perspective is that 
failures to withhold to the rarely occurring targets are actually motor response inhibition errors rather than 
perceptual errors per se. The repetitive nature of responding in the SART leads to the development of a 
prepotent ballistic motor program, which is difficult to inhibit when necessary (i.e. occurrence of a target) 
(Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010; Head & Helton, 2014). Even when the participant is fully 
perceptually coupled, errors of commission can occur due to motor decoupling resulting from a strategic 
shift towards speed of response, not perceptual decoupling per se (Head & Helton, 2013). Therefore an 
additional research goal was to examine how the inclusion of spider picture stimuli impacted reports of task-
related and task-unrelated thoughts during the SART. Thus, along with performance on the SART, we 
measured participants’ subjective arousal levels, both energetic and tense, and both task-related and task-
unrelated thoughts with four subscales from the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews, 
Joyner, Gilliland, Huggins, & Falconer, 1999; Matthews et al., 2002).  
It was expected that participants’ performance would be enhanced when exposed to spider pictures in the 
SART, and that they would also report higher levels of anxiety, showing that task-relevant anxiety improves 
response inhibition. Specifically, participants would be said to show ‘better’ performance if their speed or 
accuracy was superior in a SART incorporating pictures of spiders in comparison to performance on the 
neutral number stimuli SART. According to the mind-wandering perspective of the SART, increased 
commission errors should occur when task-unrelated thoughts are more prevalent, revealed by a positive 
association between these metrics. From the motor perspective however, commission errors will be more 
frequent when response times are shorter, reflecting a speed-accuracy trade-off, rather than a relationship 
with task-unrelated thoughts. Indeed, from the motor perspective, self-reported task-related thoughts elicited 
after the SART likely reflect awareness of task performance and may even be influenced by performance 
itself (performance appraisal), e.g., a sportsperson following a match, stewing over a game in which they 
made many mistakes. McAvinue, O’Keefe, McMackin, & Robertson (2005) observed that people were 
aware of their SART commission errors 99.1% of the time.  People are fully aware of their performance on 
the task. It was predicted that a speed-accuracy trade-off will be apparent, i.e. participants who overall 
respond faster should make more errors of commission, and vice versa.  
 
2. Method 
 
2.1   Participants 
Sixty-seven (39 females, 28 males) undergraduate students from the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch, New Zealand, participated in this study. They ranged in age between 17 and 42 years (M =  
21.7 years, SD =  5.0). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
2.2    Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested in individual cubicles. They were given an information sheet and a consent form 
which they signed. Participants were seated approximately 50 cm in front of a computer screen (377 mm x 
303 mm, 75 Hz refresh rate) that was mounted at eye level. Their head movements were not restrained. Wrist 
watches were removed and mobile phones were switched off. Stimuli presentation and response accuracy 
and timing were achieved using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Two 
SARTs were used, the original number SART and the new picture SART. Both required participants to 
respond by pressing the spacebar to frequently-occurring Go stimuli and withhold responses to rarely 
occurring No-Go targets. Go stimuli occurred with a probability of 0.89 and No-Go targets occurred with a 
probability of 0.11. The tasks were each 4.3 min long and consisted of 225 trials. Stimuli were presented 
centrally in the screen for approximately 250 ms, followed immediately by a 900 ms mask comprising of a 
circle with a diagonal line through it. From the onset of the stimuli participants had a 1100 ms window to 
register a response. The number SART was an exact replica of that used by Robertson et al. (1997). It 
required participants to monitor the screen for number stimuli, withholding responses to the number 3 (No-
Go target) and responding to all other numbers 1-9 (Go stimuli). Digits varied in size and were randomly 
selected from sizes 48, 72, 94, 100 and 120, and were all of Arial font. There were two versions of the 
picture SART, both comprising of a mixture of pictures of spiders and pictures of neutral objects or scenes. 
Both picture sets were taken from the Geneva Affective Picture Database (GAPED; Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 
2011). Examples of the picture stimuli can be seen in Fig 1. Picture stimuli were sized so that they stretched 
to fit the entire screen, thus their dimensions were the same as the computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm). The 
mean arousal ratings for the spider pictures was M = 64.6 (SD = 6.8), while the mean arousal ratings for the 
neutral pictures was M = 24.9 (SD = 7.8). The mean valence ratings for the spider pictures was M = 27.6 (SD 
= 8.0), while the mean valence ratings for the neutral pictures was M = 55.8 (SD = 6.1). In one version the 
spider pictures were used as No-Go targets and the neutral pictures were used as Go stimuli. In the other 
version the neutral pictures were used as No-Go targets and the spider pictures were used as Go stimuli. Four 
subscales from the DSSQ (Matthews et al., 1999) were used to gauge energetic arousal, tense arousal, task-
related thoughts, and task-unrelated thoughts. Two additional questions were also asked, the first being “Are 
you afraid of spiders?” and the second being “How much do you dislike spiders?” Participants answered this 
using a 5-pt Likert scale. All participants completed the number SART and one of the two picture SARTs. 
Through random assignment, half completed the picture SART which utilised spider pictures as No-Go 
targets and neutral pictures as Go stimuli, while the other half completed the picture SART which utilised 
neutral pictures as No-Go targets and spider pictures as Go stimuli. The order in which the number SART 
and picture SARTs were completed was counterbalanced across participants. A practice SART was 
completed before both the number SART and the picture SART. Participants completed the four DSSQ 
subscales and the two additional spider questions on four occasions, before and after each task.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Fig 1. Examples of neutral (above) and spider (below) picture stimuli. The picture stimuli can be found at http://www.affective-
sciences.org/researchmaterial  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1   SART performance 
For each individual for each task, picture and number, we calculated the proportion of commission 
errors, proportion of omission errors, and the mean correct Go-response reaction times. These data are 
present in Table 1. Because the participant had only 1100 ms in which to respond, the reaction times are 
essentially trimmed. For each performance metric we performed a 2 (SART Task: Picture vs. Number) 
by 2 (Spider Go, Spider No-Go) mixed analysis of variance. Participants made significantly fewer errors 
of commission in the picture SART than in the number SART, F(1, 67) = 15.41, p < .001, η2p = 0.19. No 
other results were significant, p > .05.  
 
Table 1 
SART performance between conditions: means and standard deviations. Values 
enclosed represent standard deviations. 
Number                         Picture 
Errors of commission 0.46 (.22) 0.37 (.18) 
 
Errors of omission 0.01 (.02) 0.01 (.01) 
 
Response time (ms) 333.14 (73.8) 321.44 (45.7) 
 
 
3.2   Subjective state 
For each participant we calculated their pre-task, post-number SART, and post-picture SART mean 
response for each DSSQ scale: Energetic Arousal, Tense Arousal, Task-Related Thoughts, and Task-
Unrelated Thoughts. These data are present in Table 2. For each DSSQ scale we performed a 3 (time: 
pre-task, post-number SART, and post-picture SART) by 2 (Spider Go, Spider No-Go) mixed analysis 
of variance. Participants whose go stimuli were spiders reported higher tense arousal (M = 2.58, SD = 
.46) than participants whose go stimuli were not spiders (M = 2.43, SD = .35), F(1, 65) = 4.65, p = .035, 
ηp2 = .07. In addition there was a significant main effect of time for tense arousal, F(2, 130) = 4.50, p = 
.013, ηp2 = .07. This main effect was followed up with paired t-tests.  The only significant difference 
was between pre-task tense arousal and post-number SART tense arousal, t(67) = 2.75, p = .008. The 
interaction between time and tense arousal was statistically insignificant, p > .05. For energetic arousal 
there were no significant findings, p > .05. For task-related thoughts there was a significant main effect 
for time, F(2, 130) = 24.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. This main effect was followed up with paired t-tests, and 
both post-number SART, t(66) = 5.59, p < .001, and post-picture SART, t(66) = 5.09, p < .001, 
participants reported more task-related thoughts than at pre-task baseline. The two post-SART tasks did 
not differ statistically, p > .05. For task-unrelated thoughts there was a significant main effect for time, 
F(2, 130) = 23.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. This main effect was followed up with paired t-tests, and both 
post-number SART, t(66) = 6.03, p < .001, and post-picture SART, t(66) = 4.60, p < .001, participants 
reported less task-unrelated thoughts than at pre-task baseline. The two post-SART tasks did not differ 
statistically, p > .05. Paired samples t-tests were used to detect any differences between measures of 
both fear and dislike for spiders after the number SART versus the picture SART. Ratings of fear for 
spiders were significantly higher after participants completed the picture task (M = 2.45, SD = 1.23), than 
after the number task (M = 2.30, SD = 1.26), t(66) =  3.06, p = .003. Ratings of dislike for spiders did not 
differ statistically between the two post-SART tasks, p > .05. 
 
Table 2 
                                   DSSQ means and standard deviations. Values enclosed represent standard deviations. 
 Pre-task Post-Number Task Post-Picture Task 
Energetic arousal 2.55 (.30) 2.54 (.41) 2.56 (.35) 
Tense arousal 2.57 (.36) 2.42 (.42) 2.51 (.41) 
Task-related thoughts 2.29 (.80) 2.93 (.99) 2.82 (.91) 
Task-unrelated thoughts 1.91 (.67) 1.43 (.53) 1.49 (.53) 
 
3.3   Relationships between subjective measures and performance. 
For both the number SART and the picture SART we examined the relationships between the DSSQ 
self-report measures at pre-task baseline and post-task with performance. The simple correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 3 with the results for the number SART above the main diagonal and 
the results for the picture SART below the main diagonal. 
 
Table 3  
Correlations between performance metrics and self-reported measures (picture SART below the main diagonal; number SART above)  
 
Of particular interest is the relationship task-related thoughts appears to share with errors of commission 
and response time. For both the picture and the number SART, post-task related thoughts correlated 
negatively with errors of commission and positively with response time. Thus participants that reported more 
post-task related thoughts made more commission errors and were faster to respond. To investigate this 
possible mediating role of response time with task-related thoughts and errors of commission we used linear 
regression analyses as outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
For the number SART, firstly a model was tested to determine whether post-task related thoughts 
predicted response time. This model was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.84, p = .031, R2 = .07, β = -.26, t = -2.20. 
Following this a model was tested to see whether post-task related thoughts predicted errors of commission. 
The model was significant, F(1, 65) = 6.49, p = .013, R2 = .09, β = .30, t = 2.55. The mediation test was then 
performed by entering response time and post-task related thoughts into the predictive model, to test whether 
post-task related thoughts was still a significant predictor of commission errors when response time was 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Response time -.656** .097 .403** .022 -.034 .014 -.021 .099 -.263* .302* -.194 -.073 -.229 -.052
2 Commission errors -.672** .130 -.230 .147 .038 .023 -.141 .055 .301* -.069 .067 .035 .092 .104
3 Omission errors -.067 .125 .186 .337** .118 .272* .049 .245* -.002 .258* .054 .000 -.100 -.022
4 Energetic arousal - Pre .226 -.081 .283* .181 -.016 .167 .191 .240 -.089 .338** -.141 .088 -.100 .099
5 Tense arousal - Pre -.020 -.081 .151 .181 .185 .296* .120 .352** .195 .313** .042 .158 -.004 .028
6 Task-related thoughts - Pre -.028 -.035 .140 -.016 .185 .391** .104 .203 .464** .258* .180 .223 .272* .200
7 Task-unrelated thoughts - Pre .190 -.124 .277* .167 .296* .391** .186 .202 .076 .443** .037 .009 .073 -.058
8 Energetic arousal - Post -.082 -.046 .192 .409** .311* .093 .322** .416** .292* .205 .118 .104 .116 .182
9 Tense arousal - Post -.057 -.040 .202 .337** .513** .250* .344** .481** .260* .195 -.049 .060 .079 .118
10 Task-related thoughts - Post -.252* .249* .121 -.049 .110 .504** .222 .184 .299* .172 .163 .230 .269* .179
11 Task-unrelated thoughts - Post .119 .079 .095 .249* .106 .248* .242* .080 .288* .208 .152 .117 .021 .069
12 Spider fear - Pre -.200 .005 .026 -.141 .042 .180 .037 .009 .113 .147 .137 .731** .832** .636**
13 Spider dislike - Pre -.110 -.053 .024 .088 .158 .223 .009 .105 .168 .152 .037 .731** .720** .876**
14 Spider fear - Post -.231 -.004 .024 -.019 -.006 .256* .068 .014 .164 .183 .092 .824** .756** .692**
15 Spider dislike - Post -.179 .016 -.029 .076 .090 .178 -.064 .078 .216 .190 .030 .636** .886** .758**
* p < .05
** p  < .01
included in the model. The total model was significant, F(2, 64) = 25.98, p = <.001, R2 = .45. Response time 
was significant, β = -.62, t = -6.44, p < .001, however post-task related thoughts was not, β = .14, t = 1.43, p 
= .156. 
For the picture SART, firstly a model was tested to determine whether post-task related thoughts 
predicted response time. This model was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.41, p = .040, R2 = .06, β = -.25, t = -2.10. 
Following this a model was tested to see whether post-task related thoughts predicted errors of commission. 
The model was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.29, p = .042, R2 = .06, β = .25, t = 2.07. The mediation test was then 
performed by entering response time and post-task related thoughts into the predictive model, to test whether 
post-task related thoughts was still a significant predictor of commission errors when response time was 
included in the model. The total model was significant, F(2, 64) = 27.04, p = <.001, R2 = .46. Response time 
was significant, β = -.65, t = -6.84, p < .001, however post-task related thoughts was not, β = .09, t = .89, p = 
.375. 
These results suggest that response speed was the main contributor to commission errors in the SARTs, 
rather than task-related thoughts per se. Response speed appeared to mediate the relationship between task-
related thoughts and errors of commission. Essentially, task-related thoughts were associated with the speed-
accuracy trade-off. 
4. Discussion 
Participants performed better in the picture SART than the number SART, evidenced by significantly fewer 
errors of commission in the picture SART than the number SART. There were no significant differences in 
response times between the two SARTS. In terms of anxiety, while subjective reports of tense arousal were 
higher after the picture SART than the number SART this difference was not significant. However reported 
fear for spiders following the picture SART was significantly higher than after the number SART. Also, 
participants who had spiders as Go stimuli in the picture SART reported higher levels of tense arousal than 
those who had spiders as No-Go stimuli. Reports of task-related thoughts were significantly higher post-task 
than at baseline. Reports of task-unrelated thoughts and tense arousal were both significantly lower post-task 
than at baseline. Correlation analyses revealed a strong significant relationship between response times and 
errors of commission for both types of SART, as expected. Post-task related thoughts appeared to be 
associated with both response times and errors of commission for both types of SART. Subsequent stepwise 
regression analyses showed there was a mediating relationship occurring, with response time appearing to 
mediate the effect of task-related thoughts on commission errors. Pre-task unrelated thoughts seemed to be 
more closely linked to errors of omission for both types of SART. 
  
The finding that participants were more accurate in the picture SART than the number SART supports the 
hypothesis that task-relevant anxiety can improve response inhibition. While greater spider-related anxiety 
was not clearly evident in the questionnaire results, participants were more fearful of spiders after the picture 
SART, suggesting this task may have exacerbated any pre-existing spider related fear. Also, in the picture 
SART tense arousal was higher in the condition that contained the greater proportion of spider pictures 
(spider-Go), even though there were no apparent performance differences between the spider-Go and the 
spider-No-Go group. If participants indeed found the picture SARTs to be more arousing than the number 
SARTs, this could explain why they made fewer errors of commission, at no cost to reaction time. This is in 
line with Robinson and colleagues whose findings suggest that the threat of shock improved people’s ability 
to withhold habitual prepotent responses on the SART. One alternative explanation however relates to visual 
salience, i.e., participants found it easier to discriminate between spiders and the neutral pictures, than 
between the number 3 and the remaining numbers 1-9. If spiders were indeed more visually salient this could 
have been simply due to the characteristic and consistent spider profile, i.e., long thin legs extending out 
from a central body, enabling quicker picture recognition. Increasing the visual salience of stimuli has been 
shown to decrease errors of commission (Smallwood, 2013). Another alternative is that a greater visual 
salience could be due to an inbuilt predator detection mechanism, such as that proposed by Rakinson & 
Derringer (2008) who found evidence suggesting young infants had an evolutionary-evolved perceptual 
template of spiders. Presumably it is advantageous for humans to be quick to recognise a potential threat 
such as a spider. A further possibility is that ecological stimuli, regardless of any relation to threat, can 
enhance performance in detection tasks. Parasuraman et al. (2009) suggest that perceptually relevant stimuli 
can attenuate the decrement in vigilance, after it was seen that biological motion had this effect in their 
study. If these alternative ideas, all in some way relating to visual salience, were better explanations we 
might expect to see general SART performance improvement, i.e., quicker response times alongside the 
improved accuracy rates, which would suggest spider detection was superior to number detection overall. 
However this was not the case, with the improvements being restricted to accuracy rates only (although there 
was a slight decrease in response time in the picture task, it was not statistically significant). 
While we failed to find any performance differences dependent upon whether spiders were targets (No-
Go stimuli) or Go stimuli in the picture SART, participants who had spiders as Go stimuli reported 
significantly higher tense arousal than participants who had spiders as No-Go stimuli. Perhaps forcing 
participants to physically respond to spiders induced anxiety, just as repetitively touching spiders could 
induce anxiety. The sheer volume of spiders in the Spider-Go condition could also have contributed to this 
(89% spiders in Spider-Go versus 11% spiders in Spider-No-Go). Given these apparent differences, it was 
unexpected that this did not lead to performance differences between these two groups. However, the effect 
of spider stimuli as No-go stimuli versus Go stimuli may be somewhat complex: even though there are a 
higher proportion of spider images in the spider-Go condition, the spiders are not the targets that the 
participant is searching for here, they are frequent stimuli amongst rare neutral picture targets. In the spider-
No-Go condition, while there are far less spider images relative to neutral images, by being targets the 
spiders are the images that should be receiving most of the attention by the participants – during all the 
neutral stimuli occurrences the participant still probably still has ‘spiders’ on his/her mind. It is in this way 
that the spider-No-Go condition could conceivably induce levels of anxiety that parallel those induced in the 
spider-Go condition. Indeed, both these conditions led to higher reports of tense arousal than in the number 
SART, however this difference was not significant. Furthermore, while tense arousal reduced from pre-task 
to post-task for the number SART, this did not occur in the picture SART. Additionally, the heightened fear 
for spiders after the picture SART but not the number SART further supports the idea that more anxiety was 
induced in the picture SART condition.  
 
Task-related thoughts increased from pre-task to post-task for both the picture and number SART, while 
task-unrelated thoughts showed the opposite, decreasing from pre-task to post-task for both SARTs. Task-
related thoughts were closely associated with errors of commission and reaction time, the two metrics central 
to the SART’s speed-accuracy trade-off. As expected, there was a marked speed-accuracy trade-off between 
response time and errors of commission for both SARTs. Post-task related thoughts significantly correlated 
with both of these measures. Participants who had faster response times reported more post-task related 
thoughts, and similarly those who made more commission errors reported more post-task related thoughts. 
Nested regression analyses revealed a mediating relationship between these variables, where the effect of 
task-related thoughts on commission errors was dependent upon response time or vice versa. Two 
explanations could be offered regarding these findings. First, perhaps participants who experienced an 
increase in task-related thoughts during the task sped up their response times, leading to a subsequent 
increase in errors of commission. Alternatively, participants adopting a faster response strategy where they 
in-turn made more commission errors may have then experienced an increase in task-related thoughts.  
Task-unrelated thoughts on the other hand shared a relationship with errors of omission. Greater task-
unrelated thoughts before the task were associated with more omission errors during the task. For the number 
SART, post-task unrelated thoughts were also associated with omission errors in this manner. While the use 
of the commission error metric for addressing sustained attention is probably not appropriate, as it likely 
reflects failures of response inhibition, not perceptual awareness per se, perhaps the SART omission error 
metric can be used as an indicator of sustained attention. Task-unrelated thoughts are associated with total 
omission errors on low-Go vigilance tasks as well (Helton & Warm, 2008). In addition, errors of omission on 
the SART were previously found to be elevated after exposure to a natural disaster than prior to the disaster, 
perhaps indicative of the sensitivity of errors of omission to disaster induced cognitive disruption (Head & 
Helton, 2012).  
Future research should determine the extent to which the improvements in commission errors noted in 
this experiment were actually due to increased anxiety versus simply improved perceptual salience. In 
addition, research resolving the causal direction between self-reports of task-related and task-unrelated 
thoughts and performance in the SART is warranted. Claims that SART errors of commission are indicators 
of mind-wandering in particular warrant further examination. In this experiment errors of commission and 
global reports of task-unrelated thoughts were not associated. This has also been the case in other studies 
using global assessments of task-unrelated thoughts (Head & Helton, 2014). Researchers using more 
immediate thought probes have found an association between commission errors and reports of off-task 
thoughts (Smallwood et al., 2004), however, as McAvinue et al. (2005) observed people are aware of their 
SART commission errors 99.1% of the time. If participants are probed immediately after a commission error 
in regards to whether they were task-focused or thinking about something else, their performance itself may 
influence their thought report (e.g., if a person makes an error and then is asked immediately what they were 
thinking about, they may conclude that because they made an error they must have been thinking about 
something other than the task). Researchers need to integrate additional measures of conscious awareness in 
order to assess these different possibilities.  
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